An overview of the rules governing employee surveillance in the workplace: cameras, emails, phones and the legal limits whose violation carries heavy penalties.
The Labour Code has tightened the rules on monitoring employees in the workplace. It is no longer sufficient to have their consent alone, as was the case before. The new version of the Code also sets the condition that an employer may only "spy" on employees with their consent, and only when strictly necessary.
For example, in a warehouse, to determine whether goods are going missing. Or by using surveillance to identify a "mole" leaking trade secrets. An employer must therefore demonstrate sufficient grounds for monitoring — the validity of which a court would evaluate if necessary.
Anyone wishing to process information about their employees — such as recording them on camera — must notify the Office for Personal Data Protection.
Camera systems are used in many workplaces. However, stricter rules now apply to their installation. "For example, cameras with and without recording are entirely prohibited. This of course applies to all other means of surveillance as well," states Vít Zvánovec of the Office for Personal Data Protection.
An employer must therefore properly justify the presence of cameras in the workplace, otherwise their use is essentially unlawful. According to Vít Zvánovec, the same principles apply to camera surveillance as to the processing of other personal data — it is subject to registration with the Office for Personal Data Protection.
Establishing the legality of camera surveillance is by no means simple. All information about the cameras must be communicated to the employee before the contract is signed, or must be explicitly stated in the contract. An employer may not install any device that would infringe on an employee's privacy without their consent.
If employees are informed about the cameras in advance, they can decide for themselves whether their movements in the workplace may be recorded. While they may perceive this as an intrusion into their privacy, on the other hand, they — and their personal property — are also protected in this way.
A company must therefore always carefully assess why and under what conditions it will monitor its employees, and must also obtain the employee's consent. If this regulation is violated, sanctions can be expected. These are imposed under both the Personal Data Protection Act and the Labour Inspection Act. Penalties for violations vary, but typically amount to thousands of Czech crowns, with a maximum of up to six million crowns.
An employee sits down at their computer and opens their email, wanting to send a personal message from their work address. Can an employer monitor whether their staff are handling private correspondence instead of working?
A network administrator can certainly arrange this, but under the law, an employee has the right to personal data protection. An employer should therefore respect the employee's privacy, and information about email monitoring should also be included in the employment contract.
"Under the law, a company should not check the content of emails. The same applies to postal items sent to an employee's address," says Igor Němec, Chairman of the Office for Personal Data Protection.
Emails may not be passed on to a third party without the employee's consent. Even in the case of an internal audit or accounting review, an employer cannot have an employee's work output verified without their consent.
Auditors are sometimes invited into companies to analyse their finances, but according to Igor Němec, they too are governed by the applicable laws — which give them access only to specific documents.
An employee picks up the company phone, and instead of a client, a family member is on the line. This raises the question of how to determine whether an employee is spending too much working time on such calls.
From the employer's perspective, it is not only about the disturbance to the employee's colleagues — lower productivity is also a consequence. Some employers respond by installing a "bug" in the handset. However, the same rules apply to this form of surveillance as to the previous two.
"We have found that bugs are a widely used surveillance tool. But a company should not install or use one without the employee's consent," says Thomas Havelka, a former military telecommunications specialist who continues to work in this field. "I consider such conduct unethical," he adds.
His company does not install surveillance devices — it searches for planted bugs in various private and public enterprises concerned about corporate espionage.
Employers most commonly install bugs in telephone handsets and mobile phones for their own protection and to monitor employees. Surveillance devices are also frequently found in company vehicles and in organisations that handle sensitive information — whether government institutions, media outlets, or research and development facilities.
A practical overview of digital security principles: public Wi-Fi, HTTPS, emails, passwords, mobile phone surveillance and secure PIN codes.
Surveillance, monitoring, security. These are all terms that have been increasingly discussed since the PRISM surveillance scandal. Ordinary users often overlook even the most basic principles of protecting their data on mobile devices and the internet. Here are six rules that will help you keep hackers, thieves, and intelligence services at bay.
Many people access social networks and email via public Wi-Fi. If you cannot be sure of the network's security, Viktor Vanek, co-author of the Slovak communication service Phoonio, recommends a simple precaution. "I strongly recommend using these sites over the 'https' protocol. It ensures that all communication is encrypted and that usernames and passwords cannot be easily obtained — making the effort generally not worth it for an attacker," he explained.
The secure protocol simply needs to be added before the website address. Instead of Twitter.com, the user goes to https://twitter.com. Vanek recommends this not only on public networks in cafés or restaurants, but also at home or at work — in case the neighbours are overly curious.
When using public access, Vanek also advises logging out of accounts and not saving passwords. For internet banking, users should do so from home or work rather than on public networks.
The same approach can save a cautious user a great deal of trouble on social media as well. The most widely used services — Facebook, Google+, Twitter, and Pinterest — already use the secure protocol automatically and without any action required from the user.
A secure and legitimate website can also be identified visually: a prominent green bar with the site's name appears next to the web address. This is especially visible on banking sites, which take internet banking security seriously.
People share all kinds of personal information on Facebook — phone numbers, photos, and even their current location. But email often contains far more sensitive content, such as contracts or copies of ID documents. Vanek again recommends using the https protocol, which encrypts the content.
However, this only applies to online services. "If you use an external application (such as Outlook, Mail, or Thunderbird), it's somewhat more complex. Whether your communication is encrypted depends on how you configure that particular account. In this case, we recommend consulting a specialist who can help you set up proper security," says the developer.
Passwords are another weak point. Deloitte estimates that ninety percent of passwords will be vulnerable to various types of attacks this year. Users themselves are often to blame, as they choose combinations that are far too simple.
"Several years ago, we conducted an analysis that confirmed a significant proportion of users choose passwords that only just exceed the minimum complexity required by the system," says Rastislav Kaššák, Head of Development at CentrumHoldings, adding that such passwords can be cracked in just a few attempts.
"It should contain at least one lowercase letter, one uppercase letter, and one number. Ideally, it should also include special characters — and of course, the longer it is, the harder it is to hack," advises Martin Malých, lead programmer at Adbee Digital.
How much are you willing to say over the phone? Most people will readily provide their address, national identification number, or other personal details that can easily be misused. If a mobile phone is being tapped, all of this information can be intercepted — by intelligence services or well-equipped criminals. Protecting yourself, however, comes at a steep price.
"There are secure methods of communication, but they are very expensive. For example, encoding cards for phones are available that no one can crack. There is just one problem — such a card costs €2,500, and the recipient must also have one," Thomas Havelka of Odpocuvanie.sk explained.
The device functions as a microcomputer that hardware-encodes the call before it leaves the phone, protecting calls, SMS messages, and data transfers.
Havelka is confident that for the high price, the customer receives an unbreakable protection system.
The catch, however, is that if the client loses or forgets the PIN code for such a card, it cannot be recovered — there is no service access, rendering the card unusable. An encrypted phone also draws attention, as it implies the owner has something to hide.
A far more common problem involves PIN codes for payment and bank cards. Users handle the four-digit code that protects their savings carelessly — often writing it directly on the card, and frequently choosing combinations that are far too simple.
This is confirmed by a DataGenetics survey, which found that 11% of people use the PIN code "1234". The top 20 most popular codes also include all repeated four-digit combinations, such as "0000".
According to DataGenetics, the best PIN is four different digits that have no special personal significance. Police also urge people never to let their payment card out of their sight, and to always cover the keypad when entering their PIN at an ATM or payment terminal.
An article on the possibilities of surveilling ordinary people, the cost of securing communications, and the fact that true security depends above all on user discipline.
Does your phone crackle during calls? Have you noticed suspicious individuals in your vicinity? Are you worried someone is watching you? There are secure solutions for all of this. But if you truly want to implement them in your daily life, prepare yourself for a considerable dose of discipline — and say goodbye to your savings.
The recent scandal surrounding the American PRISM surveillance programme revealed just how much intelligence services can actually learn about ordinary people. The technologies used for this purpose are also available in our region. And people themselves are contributing to easier surveillance — they are drawn to new gadgets from technology giants, which offer intelligence services unprecedented capabilities.
"Today's technology is very sophisticated and highly user-friendly. But in step with its development comes technology that can penetrate these systems. Smartphones, for example, are very susceptible to interception," highlighted security analyst and former head of Czech military counter-intelligence Andor Šándor.
A similar example, according to Thomas Havelka of Odpocuvanie.sk, is Microsoft's Kinect system, which is designed to progressively monitor the exact number and activity of people sitting in front of a screen, providing even more precise data than today's people meters.
If you want to defend yourself against surveillance, however, it will cost you dearly. Protecting private phone calls alone can drain thousands of euros from your account.
"There are secure methods of communication, but they are very expensive. For example, encoding cards for phones are available that no one can crack. There is just one problem — such a card costs €2,500, and the recipient must also have one," Havelka explained.
He compared the device to a memory card combined with an encoding processor. "It is essentially a microcomputer that hardware-encodes the call before it leaves the phone. It is unbreakable," he added.
Calls, SMS messages, and data transfers can all be protected this way. He noted that German federal government politicians, for example, have their communications secured on a similar basis. For an ordinary person, however, such costs are astronomical.
The second problematic factor is the user themselves. To activate the system, a special PIN code must be entered. If lost, it cannot be replaced — the system has no service access or backup.
And even though such encryption may appear to protect privacy, it can have precisely the opposite effect, warns Havelka.
An inaccessible phone, protected by expensive technology, makes both the device and its owner far more interesting targets for intelligence services.
"The biggest problem is not ensuring technical protection against interception, but getting people to be disciplined. To behave in ways that protect information. It is demanding for a person to activate encrypted calling before every phone call, or to use an encoding programme every time they write an email," says the professional from Odpocuvanie.sk.
Moreover, intelligence services and agencies can gather a great deal about individuals from other activities as well. To piece together a profile, all they need is an ordinary purchase at a shop, an ATM transaction, or data about where a person made a call or sent an SMS.
Havelka therefore gives both private individuals and corporate clients the same basic recommendation: "You need to identify what is most important and protect that."
An article on the risks of unsecured communications for politicians, the human factor in information protection, and the limits and possibilities of encrypted phones.
Ensuring the security of senior executives and high-ranking politicians is no easy task — especially when they refuse to follow expert recommendations and prefer to use an unprotected personal or party phone instead of a secured device. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico (Smer-SD) is one such case.
One result was the recent scandal surrounding the tapping of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone — which domestic media attributed not only to American intelligence services and President Barack Obama, but also to the CDU leader herself.
"Anyone who, despite warnings from their own intelligence services, so badly disregards regulations and keeps making calls on an unsecured phone is behaving negligently and cannot be surprised when foreign intelligence services — and not only friendly ones — exploit these opportunities," criticised the German Chancellor, as reported by Die Welt.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico displayed similar behaviour just a few weeks earlier at a press conference, citing savings on state finances — his barely-used work phone reportedly costs less than €20 per month.
Czech surveillance expert Thomas Havelka of Odpocuvanie.sk acknowledges that this behaviour may make Fico a target for monitoring. "He is certainly exposing himself to that risk," he estimated.
Even so, he does not consider the technical capabilities of security personnel or attackers to be the greatest risk. Quite the contrary — he too identifies the human factor as the weakest link in the chain: the protected individual themselves.
"A politician who deals with a million different things — I don't believe they can stay on top of it. There are problems with their basic security too, because it is hard to make them follow the prescribed rules. That is how blunders happen, like the toy gun attack on former Czech President Václav Klaus," he said.
Securing a single mobile phone costs approximately €2,500, and the encryption device must be held by both parties to the call. Even then, such protected communications can still be intercepted. The problem lies in what can be done with the data.
"A secured phone can still be tapped, but the data cannot be read. Encrypted digital files transmitted over a relay protocol can be intercepted without difficulty — but decrypting them is another matter," he estimates.
Former head of Czech military counter-intelligence Andor Šándor goes even further in his criticism. According to him, a politician who refuses to use a secured device may, under certain circumstances, also be breaking the law — particularly if classified matters are discussed on an unprotected phone.
"It can be assumed that discussions about inherently classified matters do not take place over mobile phones. If they did, it would constitute a breach of the law. The penalties in such cases are, of course, debatable," adds the experienced expert.
"Even your Prime Minister Fico cannot rule out having been a target of the NSA, Russian intelligence, or anyone else, given that he uses an ordinary party phone. But it also depends on what he communicates over that phone — saying it is all bad would not be accurate," he added in reference to the Slovak case.
By contrast, Šándor cited American President Obama as an exemplary case. Upon taking office, Obama was required to give up his personal BlackBerry entirely.
"He was given a state phone, which is well secured against penetration by intelligence services. And most importantly — he no longer uses any other. What is the point of politicians being issued state phones if they are not disciplined enough to use them in a way that prevents their conversations from being intercepted?"
But it is not only about phones. Sensitive information can also leak through email communications if politicians are not sufficiently cautious. And further problems can arise beyond classified matters.
"They may say things that make them susceptible to blackmail. Your Prime Minister had a minor scandal just a few weeks ago about whether or not he has a mistress. If people with an interest in that information were to find out, he could become vulnerable to blackmail," warns Šándor.
An article on the technical possibilities of mass internet surveillance, the limits of local services, the role of private agencies, and the debate around PRISM and Snowden.
The American PRISM programme, which monitors the online activities of Americans and foreign nationals, could operate in Slovakia without difficulty. The technology for such surveillance is available in this region as well. Slovak intelligence services, moreover, are interested in similar types of information as their American counterparts.
"Of course the technology is available. Any mediated communication or information passing through telecommunications channels can be intercepted," Thomas Havelka of Odpocuvanie.sk clarified.
As he immediately adds, however, it all comes down to the laws of the country in question and the willingness of service providers to hand over data to authorities. People can also protect themselves using modern technology — but it is extremely expensive and often dependent on the discipline of the individual using it.
Whether Slovak or Czech intelligence services attempted to obtain information through their American counterparts cannot be ruled out, according to security analyst and former head of Czech military counter-intelligence Andor Šándor. He does, however, point to the vast differences in capabilities and resources between American intelligence agencies and their Slovak or Czech equivalents.
"It must be recognised that what the NSA is capable of, no other intelligence service in the world can match," he noted.
"That does not mean our intelligence services are not trying to obtain the same information as the NSA — but on a smaller scale. They must, however, operate strictly within the bounds of the law," adds the former head of military counter-intelligence.
He also does not consider it problematic that American intelligence operatives sought to gather information abroad in this manner. Intelligence activities conducted on the territory of another state are largely illegal in most other contexts as well. The legal framework governing such activities is deliberately broad in most countries, giving intelligence services considerable latitude.
Šándor also draws attention to another risk that the case may bring to light.
"What intelligence services know, private security agencies are often able to replicate on a smaller scale. Yet their activities are regulated and monitored by no one," warns the analyst.
For sufficient funds, private actors can also obtain compromising or advantageous information — which may help them, for example, in public tenders or procurement processes. The systems used for this purpose are commercially available and require no special licence to purchase.
"In the Czech Republic, it is commonplace — and I believe it is in Slovakia as well," estimates Šándor.
Former CIA agent Edward Snowden, who exposed the entire programme to the public, is not regarded by Šándor as a hero.
"He is more of a traitor than a whistleblower," he said, describing his view.
According to Šándor, what the NSA and CIA were doing under PRISM was not illegal. He also takes issue with Snowden's argument that the American government was collecting the data for its own benefit.
"Neither President Barack Obama, nor the CIA or NSA themselves, can publicly disclose when information gathered in this way has helped them disrupt or eliminate terrorist attack preparations in their early stages — doing so would undermine their ongoing efforts to protect the state," says Šándor.
The former head of military counter-intelligence considers far more important whether the NSA and CIA are subject to independent oversight, and whether the data obtained is adequately protected and properly managed thereafter.
An article on how difficult it is to detect a tapped mobile phone, the most commonly used methods, and why operator cooperation is key to call monitoring.
Determining whether calls on a phone are being monitored is extremely difficult. Without specialised equipment, a person can only detect surveillance when a so-called bug has been planted directly inside the phone.
If the mobile network operator assists — and the police can request this — the interception is practically undetectable.
"A bug planted in a mobile phone draws on the device's battery, so a person may notice a rapid drop in battery capacity," explains Thomas Havelka, director of the security agency Odposlechy. On this basis, a surveillance device can be identified.
Bugs — miniature devices that transmit sound from their surroundings to a remote recording device — are also frequently used to intercept landline calls, planted directly inside the handset, just as with mobile phones.
However, far more effective than tapping from the handset is monitoring a call directly from the telephone exchange. This method is standard when interceptions are carried out by the police or other branches of the Ministry of the Interior.
A commonly used approach is interception via a recording device hidden somewhere in the room, capable of capturing not only telephone calls but also anything spoken in the room.
The most common method of listening to someone else's calls, however, is interception through the mobile operator.
Not only is there no way to detect that someone is listening to a call, but the operator has a record of all calls on the network. When required to provide specific calls, they deliver a data package with a call log to the requesting party. "Ninety percent of state-conducted interceptions are carried out in this way," says security agency director Havelka.
Another sophisticated method is a mobile interception device. One such device, known as Agáta, can detect and monitor phone calls in its vicinity from a considerable distance.
The operator can, for example, sit in a car while the person being monitored walks nearby.
"Only a complete fool would pass sensitive information over a mobile phone these days," adds Havelka.
Politicians have occasionally spoken about being monitored themselves. For example, then Finance Minister Vlastimil Tlustý declared in parliament in 2003 that someone was listening to his calls.
As evidence, he cited finding a recording of a meeting he had held in his parliamentary office in his voicemail.
An article on the value of information, illegal wiretapping, corporate espionage, weak law enforcement, and the fact that data leaks often stem not only from technology but also from human negligence.
In the information age, information is worth its weight in gold — especially that which is not freely available. Some of it can be surprisingly easily pieced together from fragments scattered along the information highways, and some of it can be stolen. That too is surprisingly easy.
In the Czech Republic, information thieves go unpunished unless they demonstrably misuse it. And even proving misuse is extremely difficult. This is why trade in all manner of espionage techniques and technologies is flourishing.
In the business world in particular, the right information obtained at the right time about a competitor can mean winning a billion-crown government contract. In a tender where the key criterion is price, sometimes all it takes is to shave a few million off the original road construction budget.
Wiretapping and sophisticated devices made possible by today's miniaturised electronics are the most frequently discussed topics.
"With every wiretapping scandal that gets picked up by the media, interest in our company's services increases by 30 to 40 percent," confirms Thomas Havelka of OdposlechyCZ – Line 21.
His website opens with the evocative question of whether you truly possess no information that someone else would want. Havelka also emphasises that his company neither sells nor installs surveillance devices — it specialises in detecting them and providing protection against them.
The question then arises as to when it is appropriate to consult a specialist and have your suspicions of being monitored confirmed or ruled out.
"Bugs typically consist of a microphone and an FM transmitter. If you hear sounds on the radio similar to those made when a mobile phone is nearby and receiving a message, you should definitely be on alert," advises Havelka.
A specialist will then conduct an initial consultation and carry out a so-called defensive security inspection of the premises, followed by recommendations for further measures.
Attempting a layman's inspection makes little sense if the bug was installed by a professional. If it was the work of an amateur, however, you have some chance. Despite the miniaturisation of microphones and cameras, a power source — usually a nine-volt battery — a transmitter, and possibly cables will always remain.
Havelka also points out that by the time a bug is discovered, it is usually too late. The value of most information decreases over time — even intelligence services dare to declassify their archives after fifty years.
He also notes that approximately 20% of people who request his services are more likely candidates for psychiatric care. And yet, as the saying goes: just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not actually watching you.
Havelka recalls how long and fruitlessly he tried to persuade a pensioner from Slovakia that his visit to her home would be expensive and unnecessary. She insisted, however, and during the inspection of her house, a working surveillance device was indeed found.
"Only later did I find out that a multi-million inheritance was involved, and that the woman's son had been trying to gather information," Havelka admits.
Otherwise, he insists that he is only interested in the technical aspect of the matter and wants to know nothing about the background. "I'm certainly not going to work in the knowledge that I might, for example, be obstructing the execution of an official decision," he explains.
The deployment of a wiretap must be ordered by a court. Ninety percent of legal interceptions take place via the unified telecommunications network — typically involving the interception of phone calls and SMS message monitoring.
A court order is a prerequisite for the information obtained to be used as evidence at trial. Any other form of interception is illegal. However, anyone who resorts to it regardless is not concerned with courtroom evidence anyway.
People who have reason to conceal certain matters have learned to speak in more or less coded language over the phone. The airwaves have consequently become filled with references to carp and unfortunate lawyers frantically searching for the actual fish ponds behind the euphemisms.
"In every tenth inspected premises, I find some kind of bug. I am not aware, however, that anyone has ever been punished for placing them," says Havelka, illustrating the practical impunity of illegal surveillance.
These are typically functioning devices — rarely historical ones that have long since stopped working. Havelka recalls, for example, a villa in Hradec Králové where a State Security (StB) resident office had previously operated. During a requested inspection, a rather fine collection of electronic insects was indeed found concealed behind the wall panelling in various rooms.
Greater creativity on the part of security forces is rarely seen, according to him. "The state is a lazy bureaucracy," Havelka says, noting that most genuine experts in the use of surveillance devices know one another personally.
Most, like himself, went through military school and served in the army. They all have to smile, he says, when they hear in the media that someone has found a bug in their car.
Such a device, he says, could have no practical value. The vibrations, shaking, and aerodynamic noise make it impossible to understand any recording. "But there are many cases where a bug is meant to be found," Havelka notes. The purpose is to frighten or warn someone.
The value of information is measured by the gain from obtaining it, the loss from its unavailability, or perhaps the degree of jealousy towards a partner. But wiretapping, according to Havelka, is one of the last methods used.
"A culture of handling information is still lacking in the Czech Republic," he shrugs.
Companies spend tens of thousands of crowns and more on technical protection against breaches of their confidential information — yet they throw important documents in the bin instead of spending a few thousand on a shredder. All a competitor then needs is a well-trained cleaner.
In the catalogue on the Seznam.cz internet portal alone, the surveillance and spy electronics section lists a number of links. You will even find companies that have no hesitation in offering both surveillance equipment and protection against it.
"We consider the practice of selling and simultaneously detecting surveillance devices to be unethical," responds Havelka.
An article on how cheaply a simple surveillance device can be obtained or assembled, why banning its sale is problematic, and how limited the law is in addressing the trade in such technology.
In connection with a proposal to tighten penalties for illegal wiretapping, Interior Minister František Bublan also proposes stricter conditions on the sale of relevant devices.
"He would have to ban the sale of many components in electronics shops at the same time. Assembling a basic bug from such parts takes a few minutes and costs a few dozen crowns," says Tomáš Havelka of the server Odposlechy.cz. "The Minister might as well ban the sale of kitchen knives, because someone could use them to kill their mother-in-law," Havelka adds with some exaggeration.
The components from which a surveillance device can be assembled are freely available for purchase. A decent device can be obtained for a maximum of four hundred crowns. The sale of such components is governed only by the Commercial Code.
A wireless microphone, for example, also meets the criteria for a surveillance device.
"We may as well go back to before 1989, when their sale was carefully recorded," says another expert on wiretapping, who wished to remain anonymous.
By the same logic, the sale of transistors — which are components of bugs — would also have to be prohibited.
Radio-based devices are the most widely used. A bug the size of a fingernail costs around 200 crowns.
"You walk into an office, stick the little device under a desk, leave, and then tune in to the transmission on FM radio outside," said the expert.
Everything therefore depends primarily on legislation. At present, it is perfectly possible to obtain any surveillance device — even one the size of a pen — via the internet.
Several companies in the Czech Republic specialise in detecting bugs. Ninety percent of them openly offer bugs for sale as well. These include, for example, kit sets which, as they are not type-approved, violate telecommunications law at most. A company cannot yet be held liable for selling them. Criminal liability only arises upon the misuse of the device.
In general, the more valuable the information someone wants to obtain, the more they invest in surveillance. A high-end device can then cost around twenty thousand crowns.
Low-frequency devices can cost several million crowns.
An article explaining the origin of the name of the Gorilla case, dismissing the theory that it was named after a specific Israeli surveillance device.
The intelligence service most likely named the operation after the appearance of the owner of the surveilled apartment. Gorilla is not called Gorilla because politicians behave like animals. The operation was apparently named after the appearance of Zoltán Varga, the owner of the monitored flat.
The former special forces officer is tall and powerfully built and worked in the private security sector. Security guards are also commonly referred to as "gorillas".
German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung recently published an article about the case stating that the operation was named after "a technique developed in Israel called Gorilla." The Slovak Intelligence Service reportedly monitored through the wall, using a device inserted into a drilled hole that standard detectors cannot identify.
"This technique was indeed developed in Israel, but it is not called Gorilla," said Thomas Havelka, whose company specialises in this field.
There is no information about a device called Gorilla to be found online either. Journalist Tom Nicholson initially stated in an interview that the operation was named after a device. He later said he had asked SIS members about it again, and that this was not the case.
According to him, the name was chosen by the superiors of the SIS officer from whose apartment the surveillance was conducted. "The inspiration was Varga himself." Police officers working on the case also say that Gorilla is named after Varga.
The Economist, in its article on Gorilla, references the book "The Invisible Gorilla". It describes the well-known psychological "gorilla effect" — the tendency for people to be blind to things right in front of them because they are focused on something else.
In a Harvard University experiment, students watched a basketball game on television involving players in black and white T-shirts. Their task was to count how many times the players in white passed the ball. Many of them did not notice at all that a person in a black gorilla costume had walked across the screen during the game.
Nicholson does not believe that SIS members would have been sufficiently versed in psychology to have drawn inspiration from the book.
An article describing contact surveillance through a wall, a device resembling a gramophone, and defences against technology that standard detectors cannot identify.
An expert on surveillance showed SME the device that could have been used to bug the Penta safe house. You screw a special bracket into the wall, insert a needle into it, and start recording. This is how Thomas Havelka of odpocuvanie.sk describes the installation of the type of device that could have been used to monitor the alleged Gorilla conspiracy flat.
"It cannot be found — it is made of plastic, emits nothing, and only transmits a very weak impulse," explains Havelka, carefully removing the device from its case.
The microphone can pick up sound from other rooms too, as long as the doors are open. The device that may have produced the Gorilla file resembles a gramophone. A sensitive needle inserted into a hole in the wall responds to vibrations in the adjacent room.
At the other end of the cable, the sound is recorded onto a recording device.
"You can actually hear extremely well through it," says Havelka, referring to what is known as contact surveillance.
The case containing the surveillance kit costs approximately ten thousand dollars. Current detection equipment cannot locate it, he says, because the device is made of plastic and glass with an optical cable and, unlike conventional bugs, does not transmit a signal.
The only defence is a noise generator attached to the wall.
Havelka brought a bag full of surveillance bugs to the SME editorial office, along with a button-shaped camera designed to be sewn into a shirt and a case containing the latest equipment developed by the Israeli intelligence service Mossad.
The Czech specialist does not sell these devices — he protects clients from surveillance. He uses the bugs to test the countermeasures he has put in place.
Havelka frequently visits clients in Slovakia as well — in banks, businesses, and among politicians, he searches for surveillance devices and provides protection against them.
Inspecting a boardroom of 45 square metres costs approximately 45,000 Czech crowns. The cheapest bugs start at just a few euros. A large but well-concealed bug was found, for example, in the office of Czech MP Kristína Kočí — it was discovered by Havelka himself.
Similar devices have also been found in televisions and DVD players. Any source of electrical power will do — even a kettle. And according to him, they are often brought in by cleaning company staff.
The simplest way to protect against mobile phone interception, according to Havelka, is to use an Austrian SIM card.
An article addressing the claim that the video from Kočner's apartment may have been recorded by a camera hidden in a thermostat, and explaining why this is technically rather unlikely.
Intelligence services denied having filmed Marián Kočner with Richard Sulík. Businessman Marián Kočner claims that someone placed a camera in his thermostat — which he has since thrown away — to explain how the video of him with Richard Sulík was made. He denied being the one who filmed it. The heating control unit apparently started to malfunction last year, so he called a technician who installed a new one.
"I am convinced that the video bug was in the controller I threw in the bin," said Kočner. No camera was found during the replacement. Kočner arrived at the thermostat theory retrospectively, based on the angle from which the video was shot.
A surveillance expert described this scenario as possible but unlikely.
"A technician opening the thermostat would have immediately known that something did not belong there. There would have to be a lens on the front panel," says Thomas Havelka of odpocuvanie.sk, who professionally searches for surveillance devices.
According to him, the camera would need an antenna or external storage for footage, and fitting all of this inside a thermostat casing would be very difficult.
"All of this applies if the device really was a thermostat. I believe the footage was more likely captured by a conventional hidden camera," says Havelka.
The footage from Kočner's apartment was of reasonably good quality. The few-minute recording published online has a file size of one hundred megabytes. An ultra-small camera would struggle to produce such footage and would also have difficulty transmitting it.
"I am offering three hundred thousand euros to anyone who brings me information about who installed that device," declared Kočner. He suggested the recording could also have been made by an intelligence service.
The Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS) denies that the video recordings are the result of any intelligence service activity. Military Defence Intelligence and the police have also denied the use of information-technical means.
An overview of the availability of surveillance technology online, mobile interception exchanges, and the fact that such equipment is no longer the exclusive preserve of intelligence services.
Companies and partners most commonly spy on each other. With the most expensive equipment, even a private individual can do what intelligence services do. Industrial espionage, monitoring of employees or partners is possible through online shops for just a few euros.
Retailers agree that their most common customers want to check up on partners, children, and subordinates. Shop revenues are growing, bugs are getting smaller, and they are becoming increasingly accessible.
For €80, for example, a surveillance device concealed in a computer mouse is on sale. One such shop protects itself from the police with a warning that the products are prohibited in Slovakia and may only be used for educational purposes.
"The most common are various programmes that redirect a conference call or send copies of SMS messages without your direct knowledge. Their installation, however, requires physical access to the phone," says Ján Mudroch, director of Mudroch Labs, a specialist in counter-surveillance.
Companies can thus, for example, protect themselves against employees leaking information. This is also illegal, however. The programme runs in the background and often cannot be removed even by resetting the device.
The more modern the phone, the easier it is to conceal the programme. It was originally developed for child protection. Covert SMS messages can be detected, for example, through a detailed call log.
The global market even offers a covert mobile telephone exchange that can be installed in a van.
It captures all calls and SMS messages in the surrounding area for up to several hundred metres. "They park outside companies or government offices and intercept not one telephone number, but all of them within a radius of up to half a kilometre," describes Thomas Havelka of odpocuvanie.sk.
Such a device can even generate an SMS that appears to have been sent from a specific mobile phone. The mobile cell costs approximately one hundred thousand euros.
"I believe they are used outside of intelligence services too. Businesspeople and companies pool resources and share them," said Miroslav Vavro of spionshop.sk.
Only signal jammers offer protection against such devices — but their use is officially prohibited in this country. Suspicious individuals also protect themselves against interception using call encryption. Experts on modern surveillance technology, however, say that these are ineffective against professionals.